This paper derives -considering a Gaussian setting -closed form solutions of the statistics that Adrian and Brunnermeier [3] and Acharya et al. [1] have suggested as measures of systemic risk to be attached to individual banks. The statistics equal the product of statistic specific β-coefficients with the mean corrected Value at Risk. Hence, the measures of systemic risks are closely related to well known concepts of financial economics. Another benefit of the analysis is that it is revealed how the concepts are related to each other. Also, it may be relatively "easy" to convince the regulators to consider a closed form solution, especially so if the statistics involved are well known and can easily be communicated to the financial community.
Introduction
Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) are established measures of riskiness of e.g. financial institutions (e.g. McNeil et al. [15] ). However, these numbers measure the riskiness of an institution in "isolation". The financial crisis taught everybody that it is not a good idea to measure the riskiness of financial institutions as if these institutions could be analyzed in isolation. Indeed, systemic risk, how to measure it and how to allocate responsibilities is currently an energetically researched topic of economics (e.g. Acharya et al. [1] , [2] , Adrian and Brunnermeier [3] , [4] , Drehmann and Tarashev [8] , Galati and Moessner [10] , Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi [11] , Huang, Zhou and Zhu [13] , Tarashev, Borio, Tsatsaronis [17] , Zhou [18] ). Hellwig [12] is a early contribution stressing the importance of systemic risk analysis. Crockett [7] is frequently cited as the seminal contribution stressing the need to augment a microprudential analysis with a macroprudential one. Concerning the approach of this paper Lehar [9] should be considered as seminal. He stresses the similarity of the macroprudential approach to the quantitative analysis of a risk manager supervising a portfolio of risks. This paper is based on two influential recent contributions: Adrian and Brunnermeier [3] , [4] and Acharya et al. [1] , [2] . Adrian and Brunnermeier have stressed the need to analyze systemic risk and have done so in a very practical manner. They explicitly develop a statistic that could play a practical role when fixing regulatory capital. Adrian and Brunnermeier argue very convincingly that incentives of banks would be distorted if regulation were based on Value at Risk not taking into account the systemic risk linked to a bank. Indeed, a bank might be incentivated to assume to much systemic risk if this risk is not addressed by regulation. Acharya et al. [1] elaborate on the necessity to use regulation to internalize externalities related to systemic risk. They argue that two kinds of externalities are relevant (Acharya et al. [1] , p. 286). First, a failing bank may trigger spillover effects that the bank does not take into account when chosing its strategy and business model. Indeed, in case of a crisis "liquidity spiral, leading to depressed asset prices and a hostile funding environment, pulling others down and thus leading to further price drops, funding illiquidity, and so on" (see also Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5] . Second, in case of a systemic crisis, there is no private solver -an institution that could for example buy a failing bank -as all private actors are suffering in a systemic crisis. Hence, the cost of solving the problem are socialized (e.g. via a subsidized mergers or subsidized capital injections).
Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] consider the Value of Risk of a group A of financial institutions given that a specific institution i has hit its VaR i (CoVaR Ai ). To measure the systemic risk to be attached to bank i, they suggest
Obviously, CoVaR depends on the dependencies that the other institutions have with the state of the institution i, especially the dependencies at the left (risky) tail.
In this paper the approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier is studied in a simple stochastic Gaussian setting. Within this framework the intuition of ∆CoVaR can easily be grasped and a closed form solution can be derived. The approach is very transparent as it can easily be linked to standard concepts of risk management viz. βcoefficient and Value at Risk (VaR). The approach is as follows: We consider a system of financial institutions S = {i} ∪ A, where we single out one of these institutions (viz. the institution i). We derive the very simple closed form representation of the systemic risk attached to bank i (Delta Collateral Value at Risk):
where α is the VaR-threshold, Φ is the standard normal distribution function and Σ Ai is the covariance of the returns of i and A. We derive a series of closed form solutions of statistics related to systemic risk. Table 1 provides a summary. Note that there is only a minor difference to Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] . We use the expected value instead of the median to define the condition of the conditional Value at risk. We also have a closed form solution if instead of Value of Risk Expected Shortfall is considered:
where φ is the density of the standard normal distribution. Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] analyze ∆CoVaR empirically using quantile regression, where explanatory variables are taken into account to produce forecasts of CoVaR, which is of crucial importance for a regulator. The purpose of this paper is threefold: Improve intuition, offer closed form solutions in a specific stochastic framework and reveal how the concepts are related to each other.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the Gaussian setting is introduced and the closed form solutions for several statistics relevant for systemic risk are derived. It is shown that all statistics are closely related to well-known concepts of finance viz. β and VaR. Also, the relationships between the statistics is derived. Section 3 summarizes.
2 Systemic Risk in a Gaussian setting
The stochastic framework and the statistics analyzed
We focus on the following problem: There is a system of banks, we single out one of these banks and we aim to measure the systemic risk to be attached to the bank singled out. Such a perspective is quite natural for a supervisor, who actually will study the risk of bank on its own first and augment this narrow risk analysis by a systemic risk analysis. The aim of the paper is to derive simple formulae of quantitative measures of systemic risk to be attached to the bank focused. We denote the bank focused by i. A refers to the complete banking system without the bank i, i.e. S = {i} ∪ A is the system under investigation.
In the following a vector (X i , X A ) ′ of a bank-i respectively group-A related statistic will be considered. Deliberately, we leave indefinite what statistic is considered; one may think of Profit/Loss, Return, Assets, Equity, etc.
Maintained Assumption: We assume that X i , X A are jointly Gaussian with expected values µ i , µ A and variance-covariance matrix
In the following and without further mentioning, we are going to assume that this assumption holds. Of course it is this assumption that allows us to derive closed form solutions. It is well known that many statistics in finance are not Gaussian (for a survey see Rockinger et al. [16] ). Hence, the closed form solutions derived later should be used with much care. But the benefits of transparency and intuition that result from a closed form solution justify to also study the Gaussian case.
The following lemma offers a closed form solution of the conditional expected value and of the conditional variance (see McNeil et al. [15] , p. 68).
and the conditional variance equals
Note, that the expected value of X A depends linearly on realization x of X i , whereas the conditional variance does not depend on x. Note, that the variance of the conditioned random variable is smaller than its unconditional variance if X i an X A are positively correlated (let us call this effect "variance reduction by conditioning").
The second lemma of great use for our purpose endows us with a closed form solution of the Value at Risk of a normally distributed variable (see McNeil et al. [15] , p. 39)).
Lemma 2:
The Value at Risk of a normally distributed variable X is given by
where Φ −1 is the inverse of the standard normal distribution and α is the probability threshold used to define the Value at Risk.
Remark: For clarification, the parameter α is relatively close to 1 (say 0.999) -and hence ϕ is a positive real number (ϕ = 3.09 if α = 0.999).
List of Statistics:
The aim of this paper is to study statistics that measure systemic risk to be attached to a bank. We will derive closed form solutions of three such statistics and also study the relationships between these statistics:
In each case a stressed situation is compared with an unstressed situation. The stressed situation is modeled by using the VaR in the condition of the conditional Value of Risk, whereas the unstressed situation is modeled by using the expected value to fix the condition of the conditional VaR. Note, that by studying the difference of conditioned VaRs the variance reduction effect mentioned below lemma 1 cancels. This is indeed very important, as otherwise misleading statistics would be generated.
At the margin note, that the difference to ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier is merely the definition of the unstressed situation. Whereas in Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] the median is used to define the condition, here the expected value is used. In a Gaussian setting of course the difference disappears as median and expected value are the same.
The closed form solution
We first apply the two lemmata to derive a closed form solution of the VaR of A given that bank i has hit its VaR (we have to be careful here: Σ i denotes the variance and hence √ Σ i is the standard deviation needed in the formula for VaR.), i.e. of CoVaR Ai = VaR(X A |X i = VaR(X i )). We obtain
The sum of the first two terms is the conditional expected value and the third is the conditional standard deviation. Lemma 1 is used to calculate the conditional VaR of X A . Lemma 2 is used twice. First when calculating conditional VaR of X A and second when calculating the VaR of X i . We are now in the position to calculate the closed form solution of
We observe that most terms -viz. the conditional variance and the unconditional expected value -cancel out if we calculate the difference CoVaR Ai − CoVaRe Ai , so that we obtain
and mutatis mutandis
Proposition 1: Delta Collateral Value of Risk equals
The interpretation is as follows: Delta Collateral Value at Risk equals the regression coefficient β Ai = Σ Ai Σ i times the impulse VaR mean (X i ). In other words: The calamities of bank i measured by its own mean-corrected Value at Risk VaR mean (X i ) are translated into systemic calamities via the regression coefficient β Ai .
Remark 1:
If i is in a stressed situation A is also pulled down (if i and A are correlated). The statistic ∆CollVaR Ai captures this effect actually through the change in expected value:
Also note that
where ρ = corr(X i , X A ). Note, that the size of i has no effect on ∆CollVaR Ai . ∆CollVaR Ai is affected by the size of A and the correlation. Hence, a small i may be systemically relevant if A is highly correlated with i. Note that in the process of supervising a bank, the statistic VaR i,mean is calculated anyway. All that is additionally needed to implement the formulae derived in this paper is the covariance cov(X i , X S ) (or β Si or β iS ). These statistics are relatively well understood and relatively easy to communicate to banks and to the market.
So far we have considered the system S = {i} ∪ A. We have singled out the bank i and studied the CoVaR attached to this bank. In this context CoVaR is best translated as Collateral Value at Risk: We consider the state of A -the others -if i is under stress. We thereby focus on the spillover (or the externality) attached to bank i exerted on the group A. Obviously, it is also of interest to study the shape of the complete system S if i is under stress. In other words, we are as much interested to study the stochastic vector (X i , X i + X A ) ′ as we are interested to analyze the vector (X i , X A ) ′ . In the appendix we calculate variance-covariance matrix of (X i , X i + X A ) ′ = (X i , X S ) ′ :
Using this we find that the conditional Value at Risk of the system given that X i has hit the value x is
and consequently we have the 
Again, this is intuitive. It means that the overall risk attached to bank i consists of the bank's own risk plus its collateral risk. If bank i hits its VaR the system is directly pulled down as i is a member of the group: consequently we have the term −ϕ √ Σ i = VaR mean (X i ) (which is the mean corrected VaR). In addition to this we have an indirect negative effect (at least in the more likely case that i and A are positively correlated) as the other banks are simultaneously drawn down: −ϕ Σ Ai √ Σ i = β Ai VaR mean (X i ).
So far we followed Adrian and Brunnermeier and considered the VaR of the system given that a bank has hit its VaR. As an alternative we may consider the VaR of bank i given that the financial system has hit its VaR, i.e.
VaR(X i |X S = VaR(X S )).
This perspective is very close to the perspective that Acharya et al. [1] and Brownless and Engle [6] have recommended. They suggest to use a statistic that features prominently in risk management viz. the VaR-contribution:
VaR-Contribution iS = E(X i |X S = VaR(X S )) (Mc Neil, et. al. [15] , p. 258). VaR contribution defines the allocation principle if Value at Risk is used to allocate economic capital. The problem of capital allocation is to allocate the aggregate economic capital -defined via a risk measure ρ(L) -to the risk factors L i , i = 1, .., k of L = i=1..k L i (McNeil et al. [15] , p. 256ff). The idea of the VaR-Contribution: If the financial system has hit its VaR what is the contribution of i to this loss. In other words, if we were to recapitalize a system (a portfolio) because of a systemic crisis (because of a joint loss of many assets) what is the share attributable to a specific institution (asset).
Proposition 3:
The difference between the stressed and the normal situation is
where we use
Several remarks are appropriate:
Remark 2 (Aggregation): A useful feature of ∆ContrVaR iS is that the sum of the systemic risks attached to i and A equals aggregate risk. First observe
Hence ∆ContrVaR iS + ∆ContrVaR AS = VaR mean (X S ).
Remark 3:
The VaR-Contribution -a conditional expected value -equals the unconditional expected value plus ∆ContrVaR:
Indeed, using Lemma 1 we have
Now, we can conpare this statistic with
In both cases a change of an expected value is considered. Whereas in the top-down approach one considers the change of expected value of i given stress in the system, in the bottom up approach the perspective is reversed as one considers the expected value of the system given stress at i. 
is the allocation principle for this risk measure. We observe
Remark 5: Furthermore, note that This is as intuition suggests, as the statistics ContrVaR xy equal conditional expectations corrected with unconditional expectations.
The next result relates the statistics based on Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] to that of Proposition 3. Indeed, the formula for ∆ContrVaR iS closely resembles that of ∆CondVaR Si . The only difference is the denominator. Whereas it is 1 std(X i ) in case of ∆CondVaR Si it is 1 std(X S ) in the case of ∆ContrVaR iS .
Proposition 4:
The statistics ∆CondVaR Si and ∆ContrVaR iS are closely related:
Using Proposition 4 we can quickly find an additivity result for the Conditional Value at Risk.
Proposition 5:
The weighted sum of Conditional Values at Risk equals aggregated risk: 
Conclusion
We have derived a battery of closed form solutions of statistics of systemic risk calculated in a Gaussian setting. The formulae allow us to relate the systemic risk statisics to well known concepts of financial economics viz. VaR and β-coefficient. We also derive a collection of result that reveal how the different statistics of systemic risk are related to each other. For sake of transparency a table of the formulae is provided. ∆CollVaR Ai = VaR(X A |X i = VaR(X i )) − VaR(X A |X i = E(X i )) = β Ai VaR mean (X i ) = ρ · ϕ · std(X A ) = E(X A |X i = VaR(X i )) − µ A ∆CondVaR Si = VaR(X S |X i = VaR(X i )) − VaR(X S |X i = E(X i )) = β Ai VaR mean (X i ) + VaR mean (X i ) = β Si VaR mean (X i ) ∆ContrVaR iS = VaR(X i |X S = VaR(X S )) − VaR(X i |X S = E(X S )) = β iS VaR mean (X i ) = E(X i |X S = VaR(X S )) − µ i
and we have
